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THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
By John Rawls, Harvard University Press, 1999. Pp. 199. $22.50 
 
Reviewed by Frank J. Garcia* 
 
Since the publication in 1971 of A Theory of Justice, many scholars 
have sought to apply John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness to 
international justice problems.1 Rawls himself refrained from doing so in 
that work, which disappointed many commentators.2 Since then, Rawls 
has steadfastly continued to refuse the international extension of justice as 
fairness. In 1993, he published an essay in which he attempts to work out 
an alternative approach to international justice, the so-called “Law of 
Peoples.”3 This short sketch of his position, again falling well short of a 
full international application of justice as fairness, continued to disappoint 
even sympathetic commentators.4 Despite Rawls’ own reticence, interest 
in the international application of justice as fairness continues unabated.5
Commentators hoping that the much-anticipated publication of 
Rawls’s most recent book, The Law of Peoples, would signal a 
reconsideration of his position need consider only the title alone to realize 
that they will once again be disappointed. Although this book is a fuller 
treatment of the issues raised in the earlier essay, the position Rawls holds 
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. The author would like to thank Samuel 
Rickless and Benjamin James Stevenson for useful conversations regarding this project, and Mr. 
Stevenson for excellent research support as well. Portions of this manuscript were completed while the 
author was a visiting professor at the University of Houston Law Center, and the author would like to 
thank that library staff for their invaluable assistance. 
1 Notable treatments since publication of A THEORY OF JUSTICE include: BRIAN BARRY, THE 
LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE (1973); CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (1979); David A. J. Richards, International Distributive Justice, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 275 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); and THOMAS 
POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989). 
2 See, e.g., BEITZ, supra note 1, at 128; CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN 
MAN 253-62 (1993); Anthony D’Amato, International Law and Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 5 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 525, 530-34 (1975). 
3 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 36 (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, 
CRITICAL INQUIRY]. 
4 THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-19 (1995) (undercutting Rawls’s 
objections to an international application of justice as fairness as “not convincing”). 
5 See Jon Mandle, Globalization and Justice, 570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 126, 
127-29 (2000); Ethan Kapstein, Distributive Justice and International Trade, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 
175, 175-76 (1999); Richard J. McLaughlin, Sovereignty, Utility, and Fairness: Using U.S. Takings 
Law to Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing Approach to Global Environmental Disputes in the 
WTO, 78 OR. L. REV. 855, 898-900 (1999); Richard W. Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage 
to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (1999). 
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with respect to distributive justice remains unchanged: international justice 
is not justice as fairness, but merely “the foreign policy of a liberal 
people,” and some would argue a cribbed one at that. 
This review will evaluate, from the perspective of an academic 
international lawyer sympathetic to Rawls’s overall theoretical project,6 
several criticisms which have been made or can be made with regard to 
the positions Rawls adopts, taking the earlier essay and the new book as 
one for this purpose. After a brief summary of the theory of justice as 
fairness, I will summarize the argument of The Law of Peoples. I will then 
examine two criticisms: first, that the law of peoples is inadequate as a 
reconstruction of contemporary international law; and second, that the law 
of peoples is inadequate as a theory of international justice. Put another 
way, the complaints are that The Law of Peoples fails to account both for 
what international law is at present, and what it ought to be. I conclude 
that the failure lies not with Rawls’s basic enterprise, but his failure to 
follow it through as rigorously with respect to international justice as he 
does for domestic justice. 
I. RAWLSIAN JUSTICE, DOMESTIC AND OTHERWISE 
The “general conception” of justice as fairness as Rawls presents it in 
A Theory of Justice consists of a single central idea: “All social primary 
goods—liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect—are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any 
or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored.”7 This 
general conception is further developed into two principles, the principle 
of equal liberty, and the difference principle.8 It is Rawls’s contention that 
6 Philosophers and political scientists have from within their own disciplines particular 
complaints and perspectives on Rawls’s international work and work in general, and while I draw 
upon their work I do not attempt such critiques myself. As my own work reveals, I find Rawls’s basic 
theory useful and compelling, although his own international applications, and non-applications, are 
disappointing for the reasons this review will discuss. Therefore, my critique is in an important sense 
an “internal” one and not an “external” one. 
7 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 303 (1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. 
8 In the resulting special conception of justice, the two principles take the following form: 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
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the application of these two principles would be adequate to assure the 
implementation of a just overall system of allocation of social primary 
goods. However, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls confines himself to 
articulating principles of justice for domestic society (more will be said 
about this later). In The Law of Peoples, by contrast, he explicitly tackles 
the question of justice between societies, or as he puts it, justice within the 
“society of peoples.” 
Rawls begins by focusing his attention not on states, but on 
“peoples,” a political conception of society as consisting of individuals 
sharing conceptions of what it means to be a political being (i.e., 
citizenship) and how individuals, singly and together, act through political 
institutions.9 By “law of peoples,” Rawls means a particular political 
conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of 
international law and practice between and among peoples.10 In fact, the 
law of peoples constitutes a “society of peoples,” consisting of all those 
peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the law of peoples in their 
mutual relations. Rawls acknowledges that there may be more than one 
law of peoples which might satisfy his criteria, and refers collectively to 
this set as “The Law of Peoples.”11
Rawls takes as his task to articulate how “the content of the Law of 
Peoples might be developed out of a liberal idea of justice similar to, but 
more general than . . . justice as fairness.”12 To do so, he sets out five 
types of societies: liberal, decent hierarchical, outlaw, burdened, and 
benevolent absolutist; and argues for a set of principles which 
representatives of liberal peoples would choose to govern their 
associations with certain of the other four types of societies. He 
characterizes this effort, quite passionately, as “realistic utopianism,” 
whereby political philosophy seeks to expand what is ordinarily 
considered the limits of practical political possibility. His concern here, 
and the core of this project, is to articulate a basis upon which liberal and 
non-liberal but decent peoples can agree on principles of fair 
coexistence.13 His project, therefore, is the formulation of normative 
Id. at 302. 
For a useful and critical overview of Rawls’s basic theory, see BARRY, supra note 1, at 34-52; see also 
ROBERT P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS chs. 13-17 (1977); READING RAWLS chs. 4 & 8 (Norman 
Daniels, ed. 1977). 
9 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 23 (1999) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PEOPLES]. 
10 Id. at 3 (introducing the concept of the “Law of Peoples” and distinguishing it from justice 
as fairness). 
11 Id. at 4 n.4. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 See id. at 5-6. It is Rawls’s belief that cooperation to eliminate political injustice at home is 
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principles to guide the foreign policy of a liberal people; it is not the 
reconstruction of international justice for a cosmopolis. 
The argument proceeds in three parts: the extension of domestic 
justice to a society of liberal societies (Part I); the extension of liberal 
ideas of political right and justice to relations between liberal and decent 
hierarchical states (Part II, the most important part of the book); and the 
special problems posed by the world as we find it, or the realm of “non-
ideal theory,” i.e., relations between liberal and decent peoples on the one 
hand, and burdened societies and outlaw states on the other.14 The 
methodology followed in parts I and II should be familiar to readers of A 
Theory of Justice: an original position is constructed, first for the selection 
of principles of domestic justice, and second for the selection of principles 
guiding the law of peoples, namely the relations among liberal peoples, 
and between liberal peoples and decent hierarchical peoples. 
The second part of the argument is the most difficult and most 
provocative, in that Rawls attempts to identify conditions under which 
liberal peoples may extend the Law of Peoples to include their relations 
with non-liberal peoples. Rawls argues that such an extension is possible, 
and warranted, where the peoples are not liberal but still “decent.” By this 
Rawls means that while they are not organized according to political 
liberalism, such peoples yet maintain some form of consultative hierarchy 
whereby the interests of that society’s groups are represented to the rulers, 
and a limited set of basic human rights is respected.15
Rawls’s principal conclusion in this part of the argument is that 
liberalism does not require, as a cornerstone of a just foreign policy, that 
liberal peoples actively seek that all states be liberal.16 It is enough that 
they be “decent,” and that they not be so burdened so as to defeat domestic 
justice. The alternative, Rawls argues, denies the respect due the domestic 
political choices of decent non-liberal peoples, even if liberal peoples 
would not consider those choices to result in a fully just society.17 In 
the critical condition for peace and security abroad. In this sense, his project is a reaction against the 
view that peace abroad requires liberalism at home. This view, Rawls would argue, yields not peace 
but war, as a misguided commitment to reversing the results of domestic political choices pits liberal 
states against decent but hierarchical states. 
 14 Id. at 89-90 (explaining that outlaw states are those that refuse to comply with a reasonable law 
of peoples, while burdened societies are characterized by unfavorable conditions that make achieving 
a well-ordered regime impossible). 
15 Id. at 63-67 (enumerating the criteria for decent hierarchical societies, including a lack of 
aggressive aims and a recognition that diplomacy and trade are means to legitimate ends). 
16 Id. at 82-85 (rejecting a policy of economic incentives to decent non-liberal peoples in 
exchange for becoming more liberal). 
17 Id. at 82-84 (disapproving of a foreign policy which assumes that only a liberal democratic 
society can be acceptable). 
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effect, Rawls argues that a decent hierarchical society is “just enough,” 
and to require further justice and different choices as a condition of 
peaceful coexistence and cooperation serves the interests of neither liberal 
peoples nor decent hierarchical peoples. 
By so extending the Law of Peoples, Rawls argues in effect that 
among decent peoples the principle of toleration is paramount for the 
attainment of peace and stability, the twin conditions under which 
domestic justice best flourishes.18 This leaves two other cases: relations 
with burdened societies and with outlaw states. Under the Law of Peoples, 
liberal states owe a duty of assistance to burdened societies, whose 
resources are inadequate for the formation of just domestic political 
institutions. However, in no case do the obligations of the Law of Peoples 
extend to relations with outlaw states. Such states, by rejecting the Law of 
Peoples (in particular the principle of non-aggression), expose themselves 
to the possibility of just armed aggression when they threaten liberal and 
decent peoples. 
II. PROBLEMS WITH RAWLS’S TREATMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
From an international legal point of view, the issues which may be 
raised with respect to Rawls’s approach sort themselves into two types of 
complaints: first, that The Law of Peoples is an inadequate account of the 
doctrinal and normative content of contemporary international law as we 
actually find it; and second, that The Law of Peoples fails in its vision of 
what a liberal international law should be from a normative perspective. 
A. Treatment of International Law is Inadequate 
Commentators have raised two criticisms with respect to the 
adequacy with which Rawls’s approach to international law captures the 
doctrinal and normative structure of contemporary international law: that 
Rawls’s methodology is statist,19 and that his commitment to tolerance 
undercuts accepted international human rights.20
When an international lawyer accuses a doctrine or theory of being 
“statist,” that is generally understood to be a bad thing. Political theorists 
have also raised the same issue, but under a different rubric, namely the 
18 See id. at 59-62, 64-67, 83-84. This emphasizes the “great importance of all decent peoples’ 
maintaining their self-respect and having the respect of other liberal or decent peoples.” Id. at 62. 
19 Lea Brilmayer, What Use is John Rawls’ Theory of Justice to Public International Law?, 6 
INT’L LEGAL THEORY (forthcoming) (on file with author). 
20 FERNANDO TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he 
range and kind of human rights that are now recognized by international law considerably exceeds the 
modest requirements of legitimacy proposed by Rawls.”). 
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problem of the priority of domestic justice. In both cases, the focus of the 
criticism is Rawls’s commitment to a two-stage argument for international 
justice. In Rawls’s view, the conditions for international peace and justice 
depend on the prior existence of domestic justice.21 In other words, the 
gravest evils in human history stem from domestic political injustice, and 
that once such political injustice is resolved, such evils will disappear.22 
Therefore, as a matter of ideal theory international justice requires first the 
prior choice by representatives of individuals, of the principles of justice 
for domestic society, and then a second choice by representatives of 
peoples of the principles to govern the society of peoples. This two-step 
approach mirrors Kant’s approach in Perpetual Peace, namely that one 
first establish the conditions for just states, and then articulate how they 
might justly interact among themselves.23
This approach can be challenged on the grounds that it is empirically 
flawed and methodologically unsound. Empirically, Brilmayer argues that 
international law has moved beyond a strict sovereignty model to 
recognize the role of international organizations, in particular non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), in international law and policy.24 
Political theorists such as Beitz and Pogge have also argued that the 
appropriate methodology for a more consistently liberal, Rawlsian theory 
of international justice would involve a single choice, in an original 
position consisting of individuals representing future individuals, who 
must choose principles of justice which are then to be applied to domestic 
and international political and distributive problems alike.25
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that Rawls takes pains to 
distinguish his concept of peoples from what are traditionally known as 
“states.” In particular, he seeks to distance peoples from the abuses 
characteristically associated with states and state sovereignty in 
international law, namely wars of aggression and domestic human rights 
violations.26 Nevertheless, in important respects the charge still has merit. 
First, as a matter of methodology there is a clear distinction between 
21 See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 6. 
22 Id. at 6-7. 
23 In his essay, Perpetual Peace, Kant suggests that a morally legitimate international law is 
founded upon an alliance of separate free nations, united by their moral commitment to individual 
freedom, by their allegiance to the international rule of law, and by the mutual advantages derived 
from peaceful intercourse. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 12-37 (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
PRESS 1939) (1796). 
24 Brilmayer, supra note 19. 
25 E.g., POGGE, supra note 1, at 246-59. 
26 THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 25-30. For these reasons, Tesón does not characterize 
Rawls as statist. TESÓN, supra note 20, at 109. 
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principles chosen in the first round to govern relations among individuals, 
and the principles chosen in the second round. The principles chosen for 
the Law of Peoples are those which govern the interactions of a people, as 
a unit, with other peoples, each as a unit. In other words, they are 
principles governing the relations among international actors, and those 
actors are aggregates of individuals, not individuals themselves. In this 
respect, Rawls’s distinction between peoples and states deflects nothing: 
functionally, they are identical. Moreover, Rawls implicitly assumes that 
the primary agents for the international relations of peoples are states.27
Nevertheless, I do not believe that Rawls’s adoption of a two-stage, 
state-based model of international justice by itself renders the results 
illiberal or fatally flawed. As a matter of ideal theory, this approach can 
still be a liberal one, even if it is “statist,” if one argues as Kant and Rawls 
do that the justice of the resulting order presupposes the justice of the 
component units. Empirically, one can also argue that states remain the 
fundamental decision-makers on the international level, even if they hold 
that power in trust as “agents” of their people, and even if in exercising 
this power at least decent states are constrained to respect individual rights 
at some level and to consider the inputs of international civil society. In 
this sense, I do not believe that Rawls is arguing, or assuming, that states 
are the only morally significant actors in the international arena, as 
Brilmayer contends, even as he assumes their functional centrality. His 
approach is statist not because he is necessarily enamored of states or their 
track record (he clearly is not), but because they remain the primary 
delivery vehicles for domestic justice, which is for Rawls the sine qua non 
of international justice. 
The charge of “illiberalism” surfaces again with respect to Rawls’s 
concern in The Law of Peoples with developing a principle of international 
toleration for non-liberal but decent societies.28 Tesón acknowledges that 
Rawls works within the same deontological liberal tradition as Kant 
(whom Tesón follows), but considers Rawls to have fallen short of an 
adequate rational reconstruction of modern international law.29 By arguing 
for the inclusion of decent hierarchical states within the international legal 
system as legitimate, albeit not liberal, states, Rawls makes two key 
assumptions: (1) hierarchical states are legitimate because at some level 
27 With respect to the stability and security of the territorial boundaries, which a people must 
have, Rawls’s discussion assumes the identity of peoples and states and the agency of the state’s 
government in securing such boundaries. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 38-39. Moreover, 
when discussing cooperative organizations among peoples, he lists as examples state-based 
membership organizations such as the GATT and the World Bank. Id. at 42 n.51. 
28 TESÓN, supra note 20, at 114. 
29 Id. at 117. 
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they represent and respond to the preferences of their citizens; and (2) 
while such societies are not built on liberal principles, their principles are 
nevertheless rational.30
Tesón rejects these assumptions, arguing that to treat 
hierarchical/communal regimes as both reasonable and legitimate 
abandons key tenets of liberal justice, resulting in a reconstruction of 
international human rights law that falls short of what Tesón considers to 
be the accepted, enforceable core of existing rights. By including decent 
hierarchical peoples within the ambit of the Law of Peoples, Rawls has 
insulated such peoples from challenge or coercion from liberal peoples on 
the grounds of violations of internationally recognized human rights such 
as gender equality and freedom of political dissent, which are not part of 
decent hierarchical societies in the way such rights are understood and 
expressed in liberal democratic societies. 31
Implicitly, both Tesón and Brilmayer argue that in The Law of 
Peoples Rawls fails to articulate a normative theory that accurately 
represents the normative structure of contemporary international law. 
International law has moved beyond statism, to recognize the normative 
priority of the individual. However, a key question posed by Rawls’s work 
is whether this recognition of the normative priority of the individual 
entails asserting the universal validity of liberalism. Rawls’s account of 
international justice does not depend on this—his account embraces 
normative pluralism, at least to the extent of decent hierarchical peoples. 
In contrast, Tesón’s Kantianism asserts the superiority of Western 
liberalism and constructs international law accordingly. Tesón rejects 
Rawls’s attempt to wrestle with the problem of incommensurable 
universalist views, based on Tesón’s confidence that rationality is 
adequate to demonstrate the invalidity of all universalist conceptions of 
human nature, except those of Kantian liberalism. 
B. Rawls’s Account of International Justice is Inadequate 
Thus far, we have looked at two criticisms principally rooted in 
international law as we find it: that Rawls’s theoretical account fails to 
fully recognize important changes in international legal doctrine with 
respect to state sovereignty and human rights, changes with important 
normative consequences for a liberal theory of international justice. Now, 
this review turns to a different criticism: that Rawls’s account fails to lead 
30 See THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 62-70. 
31 TESÓN, supra note 20, at 117-20. Tesón also cites the right to democratic governance, but I 
do not believe this right is as clearly recognized as his other examples, and citation of it weakens his 
argument. Id. at 115-17. 
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contemporary international law in the direction that many liberal theorists 
believe it must go, namely towards a fuller treatment of the problem of 
inequality and its distributive implications. 
Since the publication of A Theory of Justice, many commentators 
otherwise favorable to Rawls have criticized him for his failure to extend 
the difference principle internationally.32 With respect to the problem of 
inequality, Rawls can again be criticized as “illiberal” in that he articulates 
a principle of economic justice, the duty of mutual assistance, which 
would not be chosen by representatives of individuals as a principle of 
domestic justice.33 This is particularly troubling because, as Barry points 
out, the international distributive problem dwarfs the domestic one.34 
What is Rawls’s justification for this limit? How can one explain the 
cottage industry in applying Rawls to international distributive justice 
problems, despite his own reticence to do so? 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls limits his theoretical enterprise to 
principles of justice for a closed domestic society. Although Rawls is 
working at the level of ideal theory, one can question the degree to which 
his assumption of self-sufficiency on the part of domestic societies is 
realistic, or even justifiable, and consider the implications for his theory if 
it is not. Even by 1979 this assumption was being seriously questioned.35 
Economic globalization and other developments in international relations 
generally and in international economic relations in particular, have 
rendered Rawls’s positing of domestic societies as closed societies, if 
perhaps understandable on the part of an academic philosopher in the early 
1970’s, certainly not tenable today.36
The fact of economic interdependence among the world’s societies is 
a key element in establishing the possibility of a contractarian argument 
32 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
33 The principle that individual representatives would choose is, of course, the difference 
principle, or so Rawls argues in A Theory of Justice. See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 75-
83. 
34 On the scope and persistence of this problem, see generally T. N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (1998) (chronicling the role of developing 
countries in the GATT, the International Trade Organization, and the WTO, and addressing problems 
of distributive justice specific to developing countries under those regimes); Frank J. Garcia, Trade 
and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 979 (2000) 
(characterizing international trade as exacerbating existing problems with the distribution of 
resources); Kapstein, supra note 5 (providing a normative assessment of the manner in which trade 
gains are distributed among nations). 
35 BEITZ, supra note 1, at 143-50. 
36 In his study of the concept of fairness in international law, Franck concludes that the 
requisite level of community has emerged at the international level to sustain a fairness analysis. 
FRANCK, supra note 4, at 12-13. 
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for international distributive obligations. A primary motivating force 
behind the need for justice, according to Rawls, is that some mechanism is 
needed to allocate the advantages that arise from social cooperation. One 
can argue, therefore, that wherever social cooperation has created some 
wealth or advantage which otherwise would not exist, the social predicate 
exists for the application of justice. As Beitz puts it in his seminal study of 
political philosophy and international law: “[T]he requirements of justice 
apply to institutions and practices (whether or not they are genuinely 
cooperative) in which social activity produces relative or absolute benefits 
or burdens that would not exist if the social activity did not take place.”37
International economic relations satisfy this condition because they 
lead to increases in individual and national wealth through the operation of 
comparative advantage and principles of efficiency in general. As the 
international trade regulatory system has grown in scope and institutional 
capacity with the creation of the WTO, the gains from such social 
cooperation increase, as does the institutional capacity for allocative 
decision-making and enforcement of the resulting norms. In this sense, 
therefore, international economic relations and international economic law 
can be said to involve the creation of benefits from social cooperation. The 
need to allocate such benefits raises precisely the same sort of issues that 
are raised in domestic society when such benefits stand to be allocated. 
Therefore, even if there is a justifiable distinction between domestic and 
international society for some purposes, with regard to the applicability of 
justice theory the same basic predicate is present in both. 
If there are in fact no closed societies in the Rawlsian sense, then 
Rawls’s own reticence to extend his theory across social boundaries thus 
needs reconsideration, particularly in view of the manifest justice 
problems of the global economic system. In particular, Rawls’s distinction 
between the choice problem for the domestic justice and that for 
international justice, on which his theory of international justice depends, 
collapses. If international economic relations establish the necessary 
predicate for contractarian obligations, then there is no theoretical bar to 
international distributive obligations patterned along Rawlsian principles. 
Such obligations may indeed require some form of wealth redistribution 
across national boundaries, so that inequalities between states are limited 
to those which work to the benefit of the least advantaged.38
37 BEITZ, supra note 1, at 131. Beitz has since limited the scope of this argument from the 
strong claim that such cooperation makes a global difference principle necessary, to the more limited 
claim that such relationships make such a principle feasible. See Cosmopolitan Ideals and National 
Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 595 (1983). Even in its weaker form, the argument still supports the view 
that such a principle must at least be considered. 
38 See Anthony D’Amato & Kristen Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear 
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Nevertheless, in The Law of Peoples Rawls concludes that the choice 
problem would not result in similar principles,39 and he fails to justify this 
conclusion with reference to either different social facts or different 
reasoning. Instead, he simply relies on the fact that he assumes as a 
starting point the existing content of international law, which does not 
include the a difference principle, and casts his project as the development 
of a justification for these principles.40 Now, this bears a superficial 
resemblance to his “rational reconstruction” in A Theory of Justice of our 
moral intuition on liberty and equality, but the resemblance is only 
superficial. In arguing for the difference principle in A Theory of Justice, 
Rawls advocates for the adoption of principles of justice which, while they 
might reflect our moral intuitions, clearly go beyond existing laws and 
policies in their redistributive implications.41
In adopting this approach in The Law of Peoples, Rawls fails to 
distinguish between the extent of a plausible set of current widely 
recognized norms of international law, and the extent of our moral 
intuitions regarding international moral obligations. The two might be 
identical, but such identity cannot be assumed.42 Moreover, the extent of 
criticism Rawls has received and continues to receive for rejecting the 
difference principle in international justice is at some level evidence of at 
least disagreement over the content of such international moral 
intuitions.43
Power Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1047 (1988); STONE, supra note 2, at 254-60. 
39 With particular reference to the difference principle, Rawls argues instead that states would 
choose a limited duty of assistance, obligating them to assist “burdened societies”, societies which 
lack the resources to establish basically just domestic institutions. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, 
at 106. Once such institutions are established, Rawls concludes that the duty of assistance ends. “[T]he 
role of the duty of assistance is to assist burdened societies to become full members of the Society of 
Peoples and to be able to determine the path of their own future for themselves. It is principle of 
transition . . . for each burdened society the principle ceases to apply once the target is reached.” Id. at 
118-19. 
40 “I consider the merits of only the eight principles of The Law of Peoples listed 
[earlier]. These familiar and largely traditional principles I take from the history and 
usages of international law and practice. The parties are not given a menu of alternative 
principles and ideals from which to select, as they are in Political Liberalism, or in A 
Theory of Justice.” 
Id. at 41. They are drawn, in fact, from Brierly’s Law of Nations. See id. at 37 n.42. 
41 See A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 75-83. 
42 Rather, Rawls categorically “contend[s] that the eight principles of the Law of Peoples . . . 
are superior to any others,” but he does not really evaluate this claim or argue for this superiority with 
reference to prior moral principles, nor does he even set out why these principles reflect our moral 
intuitions on the subject. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 41. 
43 In describing the task of the representatives in the second original position, Rawls states they 
“simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to 
depart from them or to propose alternatives.” Id. While this may describe Rawls’s own approach, the 
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The compelling logic of the domestic original position and the 
similarity of its circumstances and constraints with the international 
original position are powerful arguments for the obvious conclusion: that 
some form of a difference principle would also be chosen in the 
international original position. Conclusions to the contrary demand a 
reasoned argument. However, in explaining his failure to incorporate this 
principle in his earlier essay on the subject, Rawls states that the 
difference principle, and other aspects of justice as fairness not carried 
forward, “are not needed for the construction of a reasonable law of 
peoples, and by not assuming them our account has greater generality.”44 
Given the centrality of the problem of inequality to domestic justice as 
fairness, this brief explanation has been justly criticized as leaving much 
to be desired.45
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls attempts a fuller response to his critics’ 
claims that the arguments for a domestic difference principle are just as 
cogent in an international original position, but his response continues to 
be dissatisfying. Rawls equates such arguments with a cosmopolitan 
vision of liberalism necessitating “global justice for all persons” rather 
than the “foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people” towards other 
societies of liberal and non-liberal but decent peoples.46 Such a move, 
argues Rawls, would result in a duty on the part of liberal peoples to work 
to shape all non-liberal societies in a liberal direction, which assumes 
illegitimately that we know already that the decent non-liberal societies 
are not acceptable.47 Thus, it would be better to proceed “from the 
international political world as we see it,”48 and identify principles of 
toleration appropriate to a world including decent non-liberal states. 
This argument reinforces the conclusion that in The Law of Peoples 
Rawls essentially sidesteps the problem of inequality at the international 
level, focusing instead on basic political rights and liberties, their priority, 
and their effective enjoyment as extended to international society.49 It is 
objections of Pogge, Beitz, Barry, Richards, and others would suggest that the representative might not 
in fact be so sanguine about this choice. E.g., POGGE, supra note 1, at 246 (“I am at a loss to explain 
Rawls’ quick endorsement of a bygone status quo.”). 
44 Rawls, CRITICAL INQUIRY, supra note 3, at 43-44. 
45 See FRANCK, supra note 4, at 18-19 (criticizing Rawls’s objections to so extending his 
theory as not “convincing”). 
46 THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 82-83. 
47 Id. at 82. 
48 Id. at 83. 
49 POGGE, supra note 1, at 244 (rejecting the principles of international law which Rawls 
chooses to rely on as “wholly insensitive to distributional concerns”). While acknowledging the fact of 
inequality in international relations, Rawls attributes the inequality principally to the absence of just 
domestic institutions, advocating instead a limited duty of assistance enabling burdened societies to 
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important to note in this regard that Rawls’s argument does not really 
address the global inequality problem at all, but confines itself to the 
problem of toleration for non-liberal societies. One can readily conceive of 
an international original position yielding both principles of appropriate 
toleration for decent non-liberal societies and an international difference 
principle. Although such a view might be consistent with “the 
international political world as we see it,” Rawls does not take this step. 
In the case of statism and human rights, international legal doctrine 
changed in response to changes in international relations, which called 
into question prior normative assumptions and resulted in new doctrine 
and powerful normative commitments. With respect to these two areas, the 
criticism leveled at Rawls earlier in this Review was that he failed to grasp 
the extent to which these changes were manifest in the law itself. Here, 
with respect to the problem of inequality, perhaps it is the case that again 
our collective moral intuitions have moved beyond those captured by 
Brierly’s list. The many arguments for an international difference 
principle, and many calls by the developing world for more adequate and 
vigorous aid programs, suggests that our intuitions may indeed extend this 
far. However, Rawls’s theory does not recognize these intuitions or their 
doctrinal implications, because in The Law of Peoples he shortcuts the 
process of “reflective equilibrium,” which is central to his methodology in 
developing the theory of justice as fairness. 
Reflective equilibrium plays an important role in Rawls’s 
methodology—it is the point at which we settle upon that account of 
justice which best fits our moral judgments, when considered in view of a 
perhaps inconsistent yet appealing account of principles of justice. It is 
important, because it is the point at which “at last our principles and 
judgments coincide.”50 Rawls is explicit that this process entails the 
possibility that our initial moral judgments may need to be revised, when 
we see what sorts of principles of justice arise from various accounts of 
the original position. 
“When a person is presented with an intuitively appealing 
account of his sense of justice . . ., he may well revise his 
judgments to conform to its principles even though the theory 
does not fit his existing judgments exactly . . . . From the 
standpoint of moral philosophy, the best account of a person’s 
sense of justice is not the one which fits his judgments prior to 
his examining any conception of justice, but rather the one 
establish such institutions. THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 108-09. 
50 A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 20. 
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which matches his judgments in reflective equilibrium.”51
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls does not consider the universe of 
possibilities; he confines himself to two alternative conceptions of 
domestic justice: utility and perfection.52 In The Law of Peoples, we do 
not even have two alternatives—the set of judgments represented by the 
Brierly list is posited ab initio and accepted without question.53 In so 
doing, Rawls fails to establish that the principles of international law he 
begins with reflect our moral intuitions concerning international relations, 
and that the principles of international justice he arrives at reflect our 
considered judgment as to such moral intuitions, following a process of 
critical reflection, evaluation, and adjustment. Rather than present detailed 
arguments as to why representatives in the original position would choose 
his principles of international justice over other competing principles, he 
merely asserts that they would, and admits as much: 
“Thus, in the argument in the original position at the 
[international] level I consider the merits of only the eight 
principles of the Law of Peoples. . . . [T]he representatives of 
well-ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these 
principles of equality among peoples and see no reason to depart 
from them or to propose alternatives.”54
I would argue that it is in this “shortcut” that Rawls fails to deliver on 
the promise which his domestic theory of justice as fairness suggests 
would be forthcoming in an international application of his views, a 
promise which many, many commentators have pointed out. By not 
adducing arguments for these principles, Rawls forestalls any opportunity 
for consideration of what form of international justice our moral intuitions 
do in fact require—we are left instead with the dissatisfaction Brilmayer 
expresses. It is quite possible that international justice would in fact go 
beyond the basic principles of international law Brierly distilled decades 
ago, but we must consider this possibility without the benefit of Rawls’s 
insight. 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
This review has not dwelt at sufficient length upon the positive 
contributions which Rawls makes in this book, principally in his account 
of the conditions under which one can search on the international level for 
51 Id. at 48. 
52 Id. at 49-50. 
53 THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 35-38 (admitting that the statement of principles is 
incomplete, requiring explanation and interpretation). 
54 Id. at 41. 
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liberal justice without normative unanimity. In so doing, Rawls tackles the 
same fundamental liberal dilemma motivating A Theory of Justice and 
Political Liberalism, which is just as compelling if not more so on the 
international level because the normative divides run, if possible, deeper 
and the power of states lies behind them. Articulating a principled basis 
for the incorporation of decent hierarchical states into the community of 
nations thus responds to a pressing problem of global social policy in the 
age of violent and poisonous religious/ethnic rivalries. 
Moreover, with respect to the problem of inequality, Rawls does 
argue for a duty of assistance, which for those concerned with 
international inequality problems is a surer footing for international aid 
than mere charity, or solely instrumental or utilitarian justifications for 
international assistance. Rawls also recognizes at some level the 
importance of distributive justice for international justice, although he 
consigns the effectuation of this to international support for more just 
domestic institutions. 
The principal shortcoming of Rawls’s effort is the failure to engage in 
a full-blown process of reflective equilibrium. Instead, Rawls begins and 
ends with a dated form of international law, and justifies it. The fact that 
he argues for its extension to non-liberal but decent peoples is an 
important development, but does not save this approach from its 
shortcomings. With respect to distributive justice, the number and strength 
of critical reactions to this limitation, and the powerful logic of the A 
Theory of Justice which carries over into the international arena, together 
suggest that Rawls’s own process of reflective equilibrium works: 
competing theorists present an “intuitively appealing account” of the 
liberal sense of justice with respect to international inequality that includes 
a difference principle, but it does not “fit…existing judgments [Brierly’s 
rules] exactly.” As Rawls suggests, in that situation one “may well revise 
his judgments to conform to its principles.” It is unfortunate that Rawls 
himself forecloses the possibility of precisely such an adjustment towards 
recognition of an international difference principle. This may be a failure 
of time or of energy, but I would suggest it is not a failure of the basic 
vision. The vision motivating these theorists, and underlying such an 
“intuitively appealing account,” is very much Rawls’s own, and for this 
we are all in his debt. 
 
